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STUDENT NOTES AND ECENT CASES
EVIDENCE - ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSION BY THIRD PARTY TO
EXCULPATE ACCUSED- DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST.- A con-
viction of homicide was had on purely circumstantial evidence,
which pointed as strongly to a third party as to accused. This
third party confessed to several witnesses, before his death, that
he had committed the crime. Held, the confession was admissible
in favor of the accused as a declaration against interest. Hines v.
Commonwealth, 117 S. E. 843 (Va. 1923).
The exception of the hearsay rule under which declarations
against interests are admitted is well known. It is generally
limited to declaration against the pecuniary or proprietary inter-
ests of the declarant. See II WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 1476. Former-
ly all declarations of deceased persons were admitted when made
against any interest of the declarant. Barker v. Ray, 2 Russ 63, 67,
38 Eng. Reprint 259, 261, and note 264 (1826); Middleton v.
Melton, 10 B. & C. 317, 109 Eng. Reprint 467 (1829); Peck v.
Gilmer, 4 Dev. & Bat. 257, 20 N. C. 391 (1839). The almost unani-
mous weight of authority today is that declarations against the
penal interests of the declarant are not admissible. 37 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 346, note and cases cited; 22 0. J. tit. Evidence, § 215, and
cases cited. The reasons assigned for the exclusion of this sort of
evidence are those generally urged against hearsay. Brown v.
State, 99 Miss. 719, 55 So. 961, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 345. These
same objections apply as strongly to declarations against pecuniary
interests. Mr. Wigmore, in his argument for the admission of
declarations against penal interests, points out that in most of the
cases the declarant was not shown to be deceased or otherwise
unavailable as a witness and therefore the declaration would not
be admitted under any view of the exception. See II WiGmORE,
EVIDENCE, § 1477. In a dissenting opinion, concurred in by Mr.
Justice Lurton and Mr. Justice Hughes, Mr. Justice Holmes said:
"The exception to the hearsay rule in cases of declaration against
interest is well known; no other statement is so much against
interest as a confession of murder." Donelly v. U. S., 228 U. S.
243, 57 L. Ed. 820, Ann. Cas. 1913, 710. The relevancy is as
clear, the necessity as great, and the guarantee of truth as potent
as when the declaration is against pecuniary interest. The prin-
cipal case is in accord with the modern tendency of decisions and
legislation to enlarge the admissibility of hearsay where hearsay
evidence must be admitted or a failure of justice result. The
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admissibility of such evidence arises from necessity, the certainty
that it is true, and from the want of motive to falsify. Coleman
v. Frazier, 4 Rich. Law 146, (S. C. 1850) 53 Am. Dec. 727. A man
is more likely to lie about land or money than he is to make a
false statement which will put him under the necessity of defending
his life or liberty. The following opinions support the principal
case: Coleman v. Frazier, supra; Stanley v. State, 48 Tex. Cr.
537, 89 S. W. 643; Blocker v. State, 55 Tex. Cr. 30, 114 S. W.
814, 131 Am. St. Rep. 772; Harrison v. State, 47 Tex. Cr. 393.
83 S. W. 699; Pace v. State, 61 Tex. Cr. 436, 135 S. W. 379.
-A. M. C.
DEEDS-CONSIDERATION OF SUPPORT-RESCISSION.-A father
conveyed his land to his two sons in consideration of their agree-
ment to support and maintain him during his life. After the
grantees had supported him for eighteen months they died, each
leaving a widow and infant children. The grantor brought suit
to set aside the deed. Held, Equity will not rescind the conveyance
but will administer the property for the benefit of all the parties,
rendering the grantor his reasonable maintenance and preserving
for the widows and children all that remain. Marcum v. Marcum,
120 S. E. 73 (W. Va. 1923).
In such cases, when the grantee refuses or fails to perform, the
courts grant relief in various forms. Some refuse equitable relief
altogether and confine the grantor to his action on the agreement
for damages. Self v. Billings, 139 Ga. 400, 77 S. E. 562; Schott v.
Schott, 168 Cal. 342, 143 Pac. 595; Gardner v. Knight, 124 Ala.
273, 27 So. 298. Others enforce the condition or agreement as an
equitable lien or mortgage, or hold the conveyance creates a con-
tinuing obligation in the nature of a trust. Storey-Bracher Lum-
ber Co. v. Burnett, 61 Ore. 298, 123 Pac. 66; Abbott v. Sanders, 80
Vt. 179, 66 Atl. 1032; Grant v. Bell, 26 R. I. 288, 58 Atl. 951. Per-
haps the majority allow the conveyance to be set aside. Wilfong
v. Johnson, 41 W. Va. 283, 23 S. E. 730; O'Ferrall v. O'Ferrall,
276 Ill. 132, 114 N. E. 561; Martinez v. Martinez, 57 Colo. 292, 141
Pac. 469; Young v. Young, 157 Wis. 424, 147 N. W. 361; Glocke v.
Glocke, 113 Wis. 308, 89 N. W. 118; Priest v. Murphy, 103 Ark. 464,
149 S. W. 98; See I TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 2nd. ed., § 89. Vari-
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